THE COHERENCE OF ORTHODOX FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE

If there is any statement to which virtually all constitutional scholars would agree,
it is that orthodox fourth amendment jurisprudence is a theoretical mess, full of doctrinal
incoherence and inconsistency, revealing not much more than the constitutionally
unmoored ideological predispositions of shifting majorities of Supreme Court justices.
The perception of such a mess has led to myriad suggestions as to how the Court might
reinterpret or abandon past decisions in this area in order to purchase the greatest amount
of coherence at least cost,1 to the excusing of the Court’s failure to achieve clarity and
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consistency on grounds that circumstances beyond its members’ control make it
extremely difficult for them to produce “a single coherent analytical framework” for its
decisions,2 and also to more extreme proposals, such as that theoretical coherence is not
an ideal worth striving for in the externally unconstrained enterprise of constitutional
adjudication.3 The main thesis of this paper is that the one proposition that has united the
otherwise fragmented legal community on the subject of fourth amendment interpretation
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is, to put it bluntly, false. Far from criticizing, making excuses for, or throwing up one’s
hands at, the Supreme Court’s orthodox interpretation of the fourth amendment, we
should, despite occasional missteps (about which more later), praise it for the kind of
coherence that even the Court’s harshest critics have found it difficult to approximate.
The fourth amendment states that “the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”4 Orthodox fourth amendment jurisprudence is supported by four
main pillars: the definition of a “search” (DS) as an infringement of a subjective
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable;5 the Warrant
Requirement (WR), according to which warrantless searches and seizures are
presumptively unreasonable and hence, outside of a few “limited”,6 “specifically
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established and well-delineated exceptions”,7 constitutionally proscribed;8 the Probable
Cause Requirement (PCR), according to which the same thing may be said of searches
and seizures conducted in the absence of probable cause;9 and the Exclusionary Rule
(ER), which holds that (outside of a few limited exceptions) any evidence obtained in
violation of a person’s rights under the Fourth Amendment may be excluded from any
criminal (or quasi-criminal) case against her.10
What befuddles the Court’s critics is the seeming absence of a coherent analytical
framework that justifies these four pillars, along with the veritable panoply of “limited”
7

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357.

8

See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-498; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.

10, 13-14; Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613-615; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-482; Rios v. United States, 364 U.S.
253, 261; Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486-487; and United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 700-701.

9

That probable cause is required for warranted searches is explicitly stated in the second

clause of the fourth amendment. The Court extended the requirement to warrantless
searches generally in Wong Sun, supra note 8, 479-480.

10

The Court first applied ER to federal prosecutions in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.

383, and then extended the rule to state prosecutions in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643.

4

exceptions that the Court has carved out of the last three. As one of the Court’s more
influential critics has rightly emphasized, the requisite explanation and justification
should be true to the Amendment’s text, history, and plain old common sense.11 Now it
must be admitted that the Court has not explicitly articulated the kind of justification
desired by its critics. But, on further reflection, it becomes plain (or so I shall argue) that
the Court’s decisions have reached a state of doctrinal equilibrium characterized by the
implicit acceptance of a single, simple, clear, coherent, and, above all, philosophically
respectable, position based on well-known axiomatic principles of the theory of rights.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 1, I lay out a normative, rightsbased theory of the fourth amendment that provides the best reconstruction of the Court’s
orthodox opinions (including its decisions establishing WR, PCR, and ER) and explain
how to extract it from the constitutional text.12 This reconstruction will help us identify
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the theoretical mistakes the Court has made on its way to crafting a coherent approach to
fourth amendment cases. In section 2, I consider the various “exceptions” to WR, PCR,
and ER, explaining how most (though perhaps not all) may be justified in the light of the
theory outlined in section 1. In section 3, I answer some general objections (particularly
those advanced by Silas J. Wasserstrom and Louis Michael Seidman) to the sort of
normative reconstruction presented in sections 1 and 2. I then conclude by considering
how my reconstruction could and should bear on the Court’s future decisions on fourth
amendment issues, particularly in light of its rejection of the orthodox approach in the
recently decided case of Wyoming v. Houghton.

A Rights-Based Theory of the Fourth Amendment
Among the fundamental interests protected by the fourth amendment the Court
has listed privacy,13 liberty,14 property,15 dignity,16 and security.17 Since the loss of

influential opposition, there appears to be increasing convergence among historians on
the proposition that the orthodox theory is not clearly inconsistent with the semantic
intentions of the Framers.
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dignity or security consequent upon a search or seizure conducted by a government agent
is a direct function of loss of privacy, the Court, when applying the fourth amendment,
has understandably focused its efforts on protecting privacy from unreasonable searches
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and protecting liberty and property from unreasonable seizures. Although the Court has
traditionally described the features of persons protected by the fourth amendment as
“interests” or “expectations”, these terms, at least as commonly understood, do not
adequately capture the objects of the amendment’s concern. Consider first the concept of
an “interest”. An interest of mine is a rational desire for something that is objectively
good for me. But I have an interest in many things that the state may (in a vast number of
cases) legitimately keep from me or prevent me from obtaining in certain ways. For
example, I have a strong interest in taking possession of your Ferrari (Ferraris are my life;
you couldn’t care less), but if I attempt to steal it, it would be permissible (required!) for
the police to prevent me from doing so. Now consider the concept of an “expectation”.
An expectation is no more than a future-oriented belief. My expecting to steal your
Ferrari is no more than my believing that I will be successful in stealing it. But surely
this is the very kind of belief that it would be permissible for the police to render false.
And the reason why it would be permissible for the police to deny me the object of my
interest in this case (thereby frustrating my expectations in this regard) is that I have no
right to the relevant object. If we distinguish carefully among “interests”, “expectations”,
and “rights”, it is plain (from the very language employed in the amendment’s first
clause) that the amendment protects, not mere interests or expectations, but rights.18
18
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Let us then say that the interests protected by the fourth amendment are the right
to privacy, the right to liberty, and the right to property. There are four important facts
about rights that are well known to moral philosophers and that, as I will argue, the Court
has recognized, even if only implicitly, in its fourth amendment decisions.
The first important fact is that rights are not absolute: there are occasions on
which the failure to respect a right is fully justified. For example, as the owner of a
precious rose garden, I have the (property) right that you not trample my rose bushes.
But if the house next door to mine goes up in flames and the only way for you to save the
child trapped inside is to walk through my garden, then you would be fully justified in
trampling my precious bushes. Rights-theorists put the point this way: in trampling my
bushes, you justifiably infringe a right of mine. But if you were to trample my bushes out
of mere malice, your infringement of my property right would be unjustified: it would
count as a right violation. It is important to note that the justifiability of infringing a right
depends on the way in which it is infringed. So, for example, if it is possible for you to
reach the burning building by trampling only three bushes, but you gratuitously trample
the rest of my precious garden, then your infringement of my property rights is not
justified.19
The second important fact is that it is an inadequate justification for the
infringement of a right that doing so will result in a better overall balance of good and
19
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bad than would be achieved by any other available means.20 This point is sometimes
made by saying that rights are trumps21 or side-constraints.22 Thus, for example, even if
you don’t much care about losing your Ferrari, the fact that it would give me great
pleasure to possess it is insufficient to justify my stealing it from you.
The third important fact is that some pairs of rights are such that the amount of
good required to be produced in order to justifiably infringe the one is greater than the
amount of good required to be produced in order to justifiably infringe the other. In such
a case, philosophers say that the first right is more stringent than the second. So, for
example, the fact that you will successfully rescue the child from my neighbor’s burning
building is enough to justify trampling my rose-bushes, but it is not enough to justify
running me over with your car in order to reach the house in time to save her. Thus,
philosophers say that my right to not be killed is more stringent than my right that you
not trample my roses.23
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The fourth important fact is that rights are retained unless they are either waived
or forfeited.24 A right is waived when the right holder voluntarily divests herself of the
protections it affords by consenting to (or otherwise allowing) conduct that the right
would otherwise proscribe. For example, I have a right that the police not walk into my
house, but it is possible for me to waive this right by consenting to a home visit. It is
important to note that consent can be granted either explicitly or tacitly. In Amsterdam,
there are many houses with large living room windows into which passers-by may easily
peer merely by turning their heads in the relevant direction if the curtains haven’t been
drawn. If an owner invites me into her house to look at the furniture in her living room,
she explicitly consents to my doing so. But she may also tacitly(or implicitly) consent to
my doing so by voluntarily failing to draw her living room curtains as she sees me walk
by. A right is forfeited as a direct consequence of violating (or being about to violate, or
having already violated) someone else’s (usually stringent) rights. Thus, in the standard
case, if I am about to kill you (in order to steal your Ferrari), you may justifiably protect
yourself by killing me if that is the only way to prevent me from killing you. The reason
for this is not that you justifiably infringe my right to not be killed by you, but rather that,
24
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in attempting to violate your (stringent) right to not be killed by me, my right to not be
killed by you is something I have thereby lost (i.e., forfeited).
In the rights-theoretical framework constituted by these important facts, it is
appropriate to say that none of the (non-waived, non-forfeited) rights protected by the
fourth amendment is absolute, that the right to privacy and the right to liberty are more
stringent than the right to property (though all three rights are trumps), and consequently
that it is generally impermissible for government agents to infringe these rights unless
doing so is needed to bring about considerably better results than would brought about by
not doing so.
Let us now see how this framework may be deployed to provide an interpretation
of the text of the fourth amendment. Consider the first clause:

(C1)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.

This clause itself is conjunctive in proposing that the state be subject to two requirements,
one relevant to searches, the other to seizures:

(C1-search)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches shall not be
violated.
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(C1-seizure)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable seizures shall not be
violated.

And the second of these two requirements itself contains two requirements, one
concerning seizures of persons, the other concerning seizures of things that are not
persons (i.e., property):

(C1-seizure-person)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons against
unreasonable seizures shall not be violated.

(C1-seizure-property) The right of the people to be secure in their property
against unreasonable seizures shall not be violated.

There are four main questions that need to be answered if we are to obtain a proper
understanding of these two principles. The first is whether the rights in question are held
individually or collectively. The second question is against whom the rights in question
are held. The third question concerns the proper definition of “search” and “seizure”.
And the fourth concerns the proper definition of “unreasonable”.
Concerning the first question, it should be plain that fourth amendment rights are
held individually. For a collectively held right is a right possessed by a collective, and it
is clear that the right to be secure in one’s effects against unreasonable searches is not a
right possessed by a group, but rather a right possessed by the (sole) owner of the

13

relevant effects.25 And, concerning the second, it should be plain that fourth amendment
rights are held against agents of the state acting in their capacity as agents of the state.
For it is not the business of a constitution, but rather the business of other areas of civil
and criminal law, to establish or protect rights held against ordinary citizens qua citizens.
Concerning the third, it should be plain that a search is an attempt to find
something (typically, in the relevant contexts, evidence of civil or criminal wrongdoing,
or a person suspected of civil or criminal wrongdoing), that seizing a piece of property is
taking possession of it (in such a way as to be in a position to deny its owner access to it,
whether temporarily or permanently), and that seizing a person is coercively preventing
her from going on her way.
Concerning the fourth, if one appeals to the rights-theoretic framework discussed
above and one recognizes the rights to privacy, property, and liberty to be the
fundamental interests protected by the fourth amendment, it is plausible to suppose that a
search is unreasonable in so far as it unjustifiably infringes (i.e., violates) a person’s right
to privacy, that the seizure of a piece of property is unreasonable in so far as it
unjustifiably infringes (i.e., violates) a person’s right to property, and that the seizure of a
person is unreasonable in so far as it unjustifiably infringes (i.e., violates) a person’s right
to liberty. Correspondingly, a search or seizure would be reasonable if it either did not
infringe any fundamental fourth amendment right or did so justifiably.
On this reading of the first clause of the fourth amendment, (C1-search), (C1seizure-person) and (C1-seizure-property) may be restated as follows:
25
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(C1- search)*

The right of each person to be secure in her person or property against
attempts by state agents acting as such to find wrongdoers or evidence of
wrongdoing in ways that unjustifiably infringe her right to privacy shall
not be violated.

(C1- seizure-person)*

The right of each person to be secure in her person against
coercion by state agents acting as such in ways that
unjustifiably infringe her right to liberty shall not be
violated.

(C1- seizure-property)*

The right of each person to be secure in her property
against dispossession by state agents acting as such in ways
that unjustifiably infringe her right to property shall not be
violated.

Moreover, to say that X’s right to be secure against action A by person P “shall not be
violated” is just to say that “P shall not perform action A”. And this enables us to
translate the relevant parts of (C1) into the following simple rules:

(C1- search)* State agents acting as such shall not attempt to find wrongdoers or
evidence of wrongdoing in ways that unjustifiably infringe a person’s right
to privacy.

15

(C1- seizure-person)*

State agents acting as such shall not coerce a person in
ways that unjustifiably infringe her right to liberty.

(C1- seizure-property)*

State agents acting as such shall not dispossess a person in
ways that unjustifiably infringe her right to property.

I believe that the Court accepts these principles, even if only implicitly, though it
has found relatively clumsy ways of signaling its adherence to them. The clumsiness is
most pronounced in the case of the proper interpretation of (C1-search). The Court,
following Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz, now defines a “search” for purposes of
the fourth amendment as an infringement [by a state agent acting as such] of a subjective
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. If we
substitute definiens for definiendum in (C1-search), we obtain the following rule:

(C1- search-Harlan)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable infringements by state
agents acting as such of subjective expectations of privacy that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable shall not be violated.

If we simplify this statement of the rule by making clear that the relevant rights are held
individually, and by replacing “houses, papers, and effects” with “property” and
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“expectations of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable” with
“reasonable expectations of privacy”, then we obtain the following:

(C1- search-Harlan)

The right of each person to be secure in her person and property
against unreasonable infringements by state agents acting as such
of her reasonable expectations of privacy shall not be violated.

And if we say (as we did above) that “X’s right to be secure against action A by person P
shall not be violated” simply translates to “P shall not perform action A”, we obtain the
following restatement of Harlan’s proscription:

(C1- search-Harlan)

State agents acting as such shall not unreasonably infringe a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

Now compare this formulation of (C1-search) with the formulation I claim the Court has
implicitly recognized:

(C1- search)*

State agents acting as such shall not attempt to find wrongdoers or
evidence of wrongdoing in ways that unjustifiably infringe a
person’s right to privacy.

The two formulations are very similar. There are three differences. First, (C1-search)*
makes clear, as (C1-search-Harlan) does not, that the activities proscribed by the relevant
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clause of the amendment are attempts to find wrongdoers or evidence of wrongdoing
(that is, searches, as colloquially understood). Second, where (C1-search-Harlan)
proscribes “unreasonable” infringements, (C1-search)* proscribes “unjustified”
infringements. And third, where (C1-search-Harlan) proscribes certain sorts of
infringements of a “reasonable expectation” of privacy, (C1-search)* proscribes certain
sorts of infringements of a “right” to privacy.
Of these differences, only the last is significant. For, first, although (C1-search)*
is more specific than (C1-search-Harlan) in view of being restricted to activities that
count as “searches” in the colloquial sense, the Court has never applied (C1-searchHarlan) except to cases in which “searches” (as colloquially understood) occurred.
Second, it is consistent with the Court’s opinions to read “unreasonable” in
“unreasonable infringement” to mean the same as “unjustified”. The significance of the
third difference is that there are cases in which a person retains her right to privacy
despite having no reasonable expectation thereof. Thus, for example, it might happen
that, for reasons related to fighting the war on terrorism, reasons accepted by the vast
majority of the voting population, the state declares that henceforth the police will
routinely use highly sensitive thermal imaging equipment to trace the movements of
people in their homes. In this sort of scenario, there is no expectation of privacy
regarding where one is in one’s home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,
but the right to privacy, not having been waived or forfeited, remains.
So which of the two interpretations of (C1-search) should the Court accept? I
would argue that (C1-search)* is truer than is (C1-search-Harlan) to the amendment’s
text, and makes more sense overall. In the first place, (C1-search)* fits more neatly with
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the “plain meaning” of “search” in (C1-search). In contrast to the colloquial definition of
“search” encapsulated in (C1-search)*, Harlan’s definition bears little recognizable
relation to the commonly understood meaning of the term. This is a serious deficiency in
his analysis, if only because it paves the way for idiosyncratic, ideologically motivated,
and thoroughly unprincipled “definition” of constitutional terminology generally.
Secondly, as we’ve seen, acceptance of (C1-search)* would enable the Court to keep
most of what Harlan’s new definition captures. Thirdly, there is considerable evidence
that the Court has relied on Harlan’s definition in large part because it wished to use it as
means to justify its acceptance of a principle very like (C1-search)*.26 So if there were a
textually faithful way to justify (C1-search)* without relying on Harlan’s definition, there
is reason to believe that the Court would embrace it. And fourthly, the Court has
indicated its acceptance of (C1-seizure-person)* and (C1-seizure-property)* in previous
holdings, which principles cohere far better with (C1-search)* than they do with (C1search-Harlan).27
26
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amendment is to protect the rights to liberty and property (supra, notes 14 and 15).
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I conclude that (C1-search)*, (C1-seizure-person)*, and (C1-seizure-property)*
represent the most theoretically defensible and textually accurate way of reconstructing
the principles underlying orthodox fourth amendment jurisprudence. (More needs to be
said about how these principles themselves are best interpreted and applied, particularly
with respect to the conditions under which the rights of privacy, liberty, and property are
lost and the conditions under which these rights are justifiably infringed. These matters
are addressed in the next section.) The reconstruction requires the abandonment of
Harlan’s definition of “search”, but does not require the abandonment of the principle
that Harlan was (somewhat clumsily) attempting to articulate.
Recall now that orthodox fourth amendment jurisprudence is supported by four
pillars: Harlan’s definition of “search”, the warrant requirement (WR), the probable cause
requirement (PCR), and the exclusionary rule (ER). Having explained how the Court
might use a rights-based framework to preserve the principles that Harlan’s definition
was designed to articulate without accepting the definition itself, it remains to be seen
whether this framework can be used to make sense of WR, PCR, and ER.
The most obvious place to look for textual support for WR and PCR is in the
second clause of the fourth amendment (call it “C2”):

(C2)

No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
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But as numerous commentators have noted, (C2) does not explicitly proscribe, nor does it
even establish a presumption against, warrantless searches or searches that are not
supported by probable cause; rather, the function of (C2) is to proscribe general executive
warrants.28
It might then be suggested in defense of (WR) and (PCR) that these requirements
are to be extracted from an implied logical relationship that obtains between (C1) and
(C2). The thought here is that the Framers would not have added (C2) to (C1) unless
they had thought that the two clauses were related in some way, and the relation
suggested by the circumstances of the amendment’s composition is that of logical
entailment.29 Making the implication of entailment explicit requires no more than the
addition of “so” immediately after the “and” that conjoins the clauses:
28
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antecedents, namely the tenth article of the Pennsylvania constitution (adopted in 1776)
and the fourteenth article of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (adopted in 1780),
has two clauses corresponding to the clauses of the fourth amendment explicitly
connected by the word “therefore”. The tenth article of the Pennsylvania constitution
reads: “That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, possession
free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants without oaths or affirmations first
made, affording a sufficient foundation for them, and whereby any officer or messenger
may be commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or
persons, his or their property, not particularly described, are contrary to that right, and
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(4A+so)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and so no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.

On this reading, the reason for proscribing general warrants is that searches and seizures
authorized by such warrants are unreasonable, and therefore violate the fundamental
personal rights that the amendment is designed to protect.

ought not to be granted.” And the fourteenth article of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights reads: “Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and
seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants,
therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to the civil officer, to
make search in suspected places, to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their
property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of
search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases and with the
formalities, prescribed by the laws.” For useful discussion of the history of the fourth
amendment’s creation and adoption, see Leonard W. Levy, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1999), Chapter 7.
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This is a persuasive argument, as far as it goes. But it does not go far enough.
For while (4A+so) supports PCR, it does not support WR. After all, (4A+so) suggests no
more than that searches and seizures that are not supported by probable cause are
unreasonable, and thus no more than that searches and seizures must be supported by
probable cause if they are to pass constitutional muster. But it is perfectly consistent with
the text of (4A+so) to claim that there is nothing wrong with a warrantless search or
seizure per se.
Where, then, if not in (C2) or in the implied logical relationship between (C2) and
(C1) shall we find adequate justification for WR? The answer is obvious: nowhere but in
(C1) itself. I’ve already argued that the most theoretically and textually plausible reading
of (C1) entails that the clause serves a tripartite proscriptive function: it disallows
activities by state agents (acting as such) that unjustifiably infringe (i.e., violate) a
person’s right to privacy, liberty, or property. Now the Court has rightly been concerned,
not merely with what forms of state activity the Bill of Rights proscribes, but also with
how these proscriptions are to be judicially enforced. For it has reasoned (in my view,
quite rightly) that the Bill of Rights would have no teeth, and the fundamental rights
established therein would remain unprotected, in the absence of a judicially imposed
enforcement mechanism. The fundamental question, then, is how best to guarantee (or
significantly increase the likelihood) that state agents (acting as such) will not in fact
violate the privacy-, liberty-, and property-rights retained by the people. The Court’s
answer is that these rights are best protected by prophylactic measures, one of which
requires state agents (law enforcement officials in particular) to obtain authorization from
a neutral and detached magistrate (i.e., a judicial warrant) on the basis of probable cause
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before undertaking searches or seizures that infringe these rights. So the (judicial)
warrant required by WR is a completely different form of authorization than the
(executive) warrant mentioned in (C2), and the source of its justification lies elsewhere
than in (C2) or in the presumed logical relationship between (C2) and (C1). It lies rather
in the fact that WR is the best means of preventing the rights-violations proscribed by the
best reconstruction of (C1).30
The Court has endorsed a similar justification for the exclusionary rule (ER). For
it has reasoned that some way must be found to prevent violations of WR and PCR if the
rights protected by these requirements are to be respected by the state, and that the most
effective prophylactic measure is one that threatens the exclusion of any evidence
30

See Jones v. United States, supra note 8, 498 (“Were federal officers free to search

without a warrant merely upon probable cause to believe that certain articles were within
a home, the provisions of the Fourth Amendment would become empty phrases, and the
protection it affords largely nullified”); Johnson v. United States, supra note 8, 14 (“Any
assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination
to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant
would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers”); and Terry v. Ohio, supra note 8, 21 (“The scheme of the
Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the
conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached,
neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or
seizure in light of the particular circumstances”).
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obtained by law enforcement officials in ways that contravene WR or PCR from the
prosecution’s case-in-chief in a criminal (or quasi-criminal) case against any person who
was searched or whose property was either searched or seized in those ways. So ER, like
WR and PCR, is a judicially mandated enforcement mechanism grounded, not in the
“words” of (C1) as such, but in the fact that it is needed to protect the rights that these
very words were designed to protect.31
It should be noted that the Court has fallen prey to confusion in its articulation of
one particular aspect of ER: the rule of “standing” (most clearly stated and defended in

31

See Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465, 482 (“The exclusionary rule was a judicially

created means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment”) and 486
(“The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police
conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have established
that the rule is not a personal constitutional right. [Rather], ‘the rule is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect . . . .’ United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, at 348.”) The Court had
previously appealed to the “imperative of judicial integrity”—the imperative that the
administration of the law should not take advantage of the fruits of illegal activity—to
justify ER (see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-223 and United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-537), but the Court now treats this justification as secondary
(see Stone, 485).
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Alderman v. United States). The standing rule says that “suppression of the product of a
Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were
violated by the search itself”.32 Thus the rule prevents a defendant in a criminal case
from successfully objecting to the introduction of damaging evidence that was obtained
by means of a search or seizure that violated the fourth amendment rights of someone
else. But if the function of ER is, as the Court has often said, to protect fourth
amendment rights by deterring police misconduct (in the form of refusal to abide by the
terms of WR and PCR), then the standing rule is straightforwardly counterproductive.
For it makes it possible for the police to acquire evidence in complete disregard of WR
and PCR when they have no intention of using it in a criminal case against the person
from whom it was acquired. Now it might be replied, in defense of the rule, that “the
victim [of an illegal search] can and very probably will object for himself when and if it
becomes important for him to do so”.33 But there are many situations in which the victim
does not (and will never) know that her right to property or privacy has been violated, and
thus has (and will never have) any basis for the kind of objection envisaged by the
Alderman majority. It might also be replied that there is no good reason to believe that
“the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would
justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of
crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which
32

Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-172.
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Ibid., 174.
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exposes the truth”.34 But this is merely to say that there is no good reason to protect
fourth amendment rights if there is a price to be paid in the form of significant
“encroachment upon the public interest”, which is to deny what I have claimed to be part
of the best reconstruction of the Court’s opinions, namely that the interests protected by
the amendment are rights, in the sense of functioning as “trumps” or “side-constraints”
vis-à-vis the state’s pursuit of the public good.
What we should conclude from this discussion is that, leaving aside the Court’s
holding in Alderman, the Court’s orthodox fourth amendment jurisprudence is best
understood as grounded in an interpretation of the text that itself presupposes the
normative, rights-based theory described at the start of this section. This theory, applied
to the “plain meaning” of the amendment’s words, justifies the Court’s adoption of WR,
PCR, and ER without falling into theoretical or semantic incoherence. Rather than
castigating the Justices for failing to respect the fundamental exegetical virtues to which
they are beholden, we should be praising them for finding a way to act largely in
accordance with these virtues in a complex and difficult area of constitutional law.

Rules and Exceptions
It may be that something other than theoretical incoherence bothers the critics of
orthodox fourth amendment jurisprudence. As one commentator complains, the Court
has issued “confusing” opinions presenting “incomprehensibly complex rules”35 that (at
34

Ibid., 175.
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Bradley, supra note 1, 1469.
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least with respect to ER) fail “to inform the police how to behave and to inform the lower
courts of the basis for the exclusionary decision”,36 and that WR and PCR are “largely a
sham”37 because “there are over twenty exceptions to the probable cause or the warrant
requirement or both”.38 And another wryly opines: “Warrants are not required—unless
they are. All searches and seizures must be grounded in probable cause—but not on
Tuesdays. And unlawfully seized evidence must be excluded whenever five votes say
so…The result is a vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely complex
and contradictory, but often perverse. Criminals go free while honest citizens are
intruded upon in outrageous ways with little or no real remedy”.39
These complaints may be reduced to two criticisms: first, that the rules laid down
by the Court for the police and lower courts to follow are excessively complex; and
second, that there is no non-arbitrary, principled way to account for the Court’s retention
of WR, PCR, and ER in the face of the myriad exceptions to these principles for which
the Court has found sufficient justification.
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Ibid., 1472.
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Ibid., 1486.
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The first criticism may be dealt with briefly. For, as a recent pair of
commentators points out: “Fourth Amendment law is close to a model of clarity.
Virtually every significant aspect of human interaction has already been provided for in a
relatively clear set of rules”.40 For whether police officers have a mind to search or seize
you or your property in your house, on the street, in your car, in an open field, in a police
station (after arrest), in prison, at work, in school, in an airport, at the border, at a traffic
stop, and so on, the Court has made it quite clear whether it is necessary for the officers
to obtain a warrant or to possess probable cause in order to pursue their investigations in
ways that have the potential to infringe fourth amendment rights. The Court’s rules do
force police officers to follow a wide variety of rules in a wide variety of different cases,
but they are not confusing enough to prevent these officers from learning what is required
of them in the different sorts of situations in which they have a desire to search or seize.
The second criticism is not as easily disposed of. The worry here is that the Court
wants to have its cake and eat it too. On the one hand, it wishes to retain WR, PCR, and
ER as means of protecting against the violation of fourth amendment rights by state
agents acting as such. On the other hand, the sheer number and variety of exceptions
suggests that the Court no longer views these requirements as controlling its fourth
amendment decisions. The requirements are there, not to be followed, but to be ignored.
In step with this worry, commentators have seen in the Court’s opinions two uneasily coexisting methods of adjudication in the area of fourth amendment law. The first consists
in the application of formal rules deduced from a priori foundational principles (in this
40

Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 3, 1153. See also Dripps, supra note 1, 1607-1608.
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case, the rules encapsulated in WR, PCR, and ER), the second in the abandonment of
formal rules in favor of a pragmatic methodology designed to achieve socially optimal
results on the basis of a “balancing” of competing interests (namely, those of the person
whose fourth amendment rights will be infringed by the proposed type of search or
seizure, and those of society at large, whether in the form of law enforcement or some
other compelling social prerogative, such as public safety or economic security).41
This worry is ultimately misguided. In the first place, there is nothing inherently
problematic about the existence of a large number of exceptions to a given principle. For
there may be many different situations in which the application of a requirement designed
to achieve a particular purpose will, for reasons very particular to the type of situation in
question, fail to reach its intended goal. This does not in any way take away from the
status of the requirement as a general requirement, unless the exceptions to it are vaguely
defined and poorly delimited. The question, then, is not whether the number of
exceptions suggests that the Court has essentially abandoned WR, PCR and ER, but
rather whether the exceptions to these requirements are limited, well defined, and
adequately justified.
As to this, there are good reasons to think that the Court’s opinions have been
more than adequate to the task. Consider first WR and PCR. To these requirements, the
Court has found a number of exceptions, all but one of which it has classified under five
main headings of its own devising: Exigent Circumstances, Special Needs, Diminished
Interests, Consent, and History. A situation may fall within more than one of these
general exception-making categories, but its falling under one of these categories is
41

See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 1, and Cloud, supra note 1.
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sufficient for it to count as an exception to the relevant requirement(s). Under Exigent
Circumstances, we find the “hot pursuit” exception,42 prison searches,43 and searches of
burning buildings.44 Under Special Needs, we find “stop and frisk”,45 housing
inspections,46 administrative searches of regulated businesses,47 searches of
probationers,48 searches of students,49 workplace searches of public employees,50 drug
42

Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294.
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646; Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County
v. Earls, 000 U.S. 01-332 (2002).
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testing of public employees,51 sobriety checkpoints,52 and highway safety checkpoints.53
Under Diminished Interests, we find many of the cases already canvassed under the
heading of Special Needs, but also the “automobile” exception,54 and the taking of blood
samples.55 Under Consent, we find consensual searches,56 and finally, under History, we
find three long standing and historical exceptions, namely the “arrest” exception,57 the
50
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“search incident to lawful arrest” exception,58 and border searches.59 The last remaining
exception, one that does not fall neatly into this classification, is the very special case of
inventory searches, in which the predominant consideration is the safeguarding of the
searchee’s own property interests.60
Now I do not think that the manner of exception-classification that the Court has
devised is above criticism. But there are certainly features of the categorization that are
well justified, at least on the supposition that the Court has been working with the rightsbased theory of fourth amendment law elucidated in the previous section. In particular,
consider Exigent Circumstances, Diminished Interests, and Consent. In a situation falling
under Exigent Circumstances, state agents find themselves contemplating a warrantless
search or seizure without which it would be impossible to eliminate a very real (in some
cases, imminent) threat of serious harm to themselves or other persons. The existence of
such an exception-creating rationale is easily justified in a framework within which
fourth amendment rights are non-absolute side-constraints. For, as we’ve seen, such a
framework entails that state agents are permitted to infringe fourth amendment rights
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when such infringement is required to bring about considerably better results than would
be brought about by not doing so. And the paradigmatic “considerably better result”, as
in the case in which you trample my rose-bushes in order to save the child trapped in the
burning building next door, involves the prevention of serious harm. Cases in which the
Court has found fourth amendment interests “diminished”, “weakened”, or simply “nonexistent” are easily described as cases in which the relevant rights are either far from
stringent or waived by implicit consent. If the rights are not stringent (as in the case of
relatively routine or non-intrusive searches that produce a very limited amount of
information of a non-revealing nature, such as blood sample extraction or urine testing),
it is sufficient for justified infringement of the rights that such infringement is needed to
bring about a not insignificant quantum of good (whether in the form of the correct
identification of criminals or in the form of public safety). If the rights are implicitly
waived (as in those cases in which one leaves an item of property in one’s car, knowing
full well that any passer-by who happens to glance in the right direction will see it), then
there is no such thing as infringing them, and so no need to protect them against possible
violation by state agents.61 And the same applies to cases that fall under the Consent
exception, in which permission to search or seize is explicitly granted.
61

The consent rationale for the constitutional permissibility of a search appears in

Vernonia, supra note 49, 11 (“Somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a
‘closely regulated industry,’ students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have
reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy”). What
I understand the Court to be saying here is that, by agreeing to participate in school
athletics with the full knowledge that regular intrusions upon one’s privacy are incident
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Within the rights-based framework I have described, it is less easy to justify those
exceptions that fall within the Special Needs or History categories. The Court finds a
state interest “special” when it lies beyond the normal need for law enforcement and
makes the relevant requirement (whether WR or PCR) impracticable.62 Thus, in the
school search cases, the Court has said that the state’s (legitimate) interest is not in
to such participation, students are implicitly waiving their right to privacy (at least with
respect to certain types of athletics-related intrusion). As the relevant quotation from
Vernonia indicates, the Court’s reason for thinking that the business owner’s expectations
of privacy are “diminished” in Burger (supra, note 47) is that, by agreeing to become the
owner of a business in an industry he knew to be closely regulated, he implicitly waived
his right to privacy with respect to administrative inspections. Similar reasoning would
appear to be in order in the case of Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, in which the Court
upheld a statute making the provision of benefits to a welfare applicant conditional on a
“home visit” by a social worker. The Court reasoned that, if the state notifies the
applicant of the home visit and the applicant allows the visiting social worker into her
home for that purpose, then her privacy interests have not been violated. The reason for
this, we may safely presume, is that by allowing the social worker into her home, the
applicant waives her right to privacy with respect to information relevant to her welfare
eligibility.
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ordinary law enforcement, but (a) in the safety of students and school personnel and (b)
in maintaining an environment conducive to learning (without which the school would
not be able to fulfill its basic pedagogical function), and that requiring a warrant for the
search of any student would make it impossible (or at least very difficult) for the state to
maintain order and safety in the classroom. But it is absolutely unclear, nor has the Court
explained, why a need’s being “special” (in the relevant sense) justifies the infringement
of fourth amendment rights. In fact, the school search cases are best classified, not within
some self-standing category of Special Needs, but within other exception-making
categories. For, first, the state cannot effectively protect students and school personnel
unless warrantless searches of students in the absence of probable cause are permitted
when there is credible evidence of a threat of serious harm (Exigent Circumstances).
Second, at least in the case of urinalysis, the non-stringent nature of the relevant privacy
right (coupled with the compelling state interest in preventing drug use among
schoolchildren) arguably justifies the particular form of privacy infringement at issue
(Diminished Interests). And third, at least in the case of student athletes, there is reason
to believe that the relevant privacy rights have been waived, in that students’ agreement
to participate in school-sponsored athletic activities is predicated on the knowledge that
they will thereby lose a significant measure of privacy (Implicit Consent).
Similar remarks are appropriate with respect to the proper classification of other
exceptions that the Court has classified under the rubric of Special Needs. In cases
involving “stop and frisk”, housing inspections, probationers, sobriety checkpoints, and
the drug testing of railroad and firearm-carrying customs employees, the Court has
explicitly referred to the avoidance of serious threats to public safety (whether in the form
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of violent resistance to being stopped by the police, collapsing buildings, recidivism,
drunk driving, or railroad accidents, and so on) as a part of its rationale for making
exceptions to WR or PCR (Exigent Circumstances).63 In some of these cases, additional
exception-making characteristics are present. Thus, for example, it is reasonable to think
that probationers have forfeited their fourth amendment rights until such time as they
have provided sufficient evidence to believe that they are unlikely to commit future
crimes. (We can think of this as an additional, rights-based exception-making category,
call it “Forfeiture”, within which routine prison searches also fall.) And it is clear that
non-stringent rights (and hence, Diminished Interests) are at issue in “stop and frisk”,
sobriety checkpoint, and drug testing cases, in which the interaction of the person
searched and/or seized with law enforcement personnel is brief and the infringement of
rights non-intrusive.
As for the three long-standing exceptions classified under History (the “arrest”
exception, the “search incident to lawful arrest” exception, and border searches), these
are best classified under the rubric of Exigent Circumstances. In Watson, the Court held
that police who possess probable cause to believe that a particular individual has
committed (is in the process of committing, or will soon commit) a crime may seize that
individual in a public place without a warrant. The best justification for this exception to
WR is that the costs of imposing WR in such a case (in terms of lost opportunities to
catch criminals) are intolerably high, high enough to justify infringing the arrestee’s right
to liberty. In this way, Watson resembles all of the cases falling within the category of
63
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Exigent Circumstances. In Chimel, the Court held that police who seize a person
lawfully may, in the absence of a warrant or probable cause, search the area under the
arrestee’s immediate control for weapons or (destructible or concealable) evidence.
Again, a justification that refers to the real potential threat to public safety or the real
potential loss of incriminating evidence posed by the application of WR or PCR to the
case at hand deserves to be classified under Exigent Circumstances. And finally, in
Ramsey, the real potential threat to public safety posed by mailed packages that could
only be opened in the presence of a warrant and/or probable cause suggests that this
exception to WR and PCR should also qualify under the rubric of Exigent Circumstances.
The allowable types of exception to WR and PCR justified by means of the rightsbased framework described in the previous section are therefore as follows: Exigent
Circumstances, Diminished Interests (either in the form of Non-Stringent Rights or
Implicit Consent), Explicit Consent, and Forfeiture. Apart from the unique case of
“inventory” searches (justified as a means to protect one of the very rights protected by
the fourth amendment itself), all of the exceptions to WR and PCR may be classified
within these categories. So there is no reason to worry that the number and variety of
exceptions to WR and PCR suggests that the Court no longer views these requirements as
controlling its fourth amendment decisions.
The same is true of the myriad exceptions to ER that the Court has crafted over
the years. Among these exceptions, we find cases in which the police rely in “good faith”
on facially valid warrants later found to be illegal64 or on statutes later found to be
64
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unconstitutional,65 cases in which illegally obtained evidence is brought to the attention
of a judge in a civil, rather than a criminal or quasi-criminal, proceeding,66 cases in which
the relevant evidence is obtained by private persons67 or by government employees with
no connection to law enforcement,68 cases in which the relevant evidence is introduced to
prosecute an illegally arrested person,69 cases in which the relevant evidence is
introduced for purposes of impeachment at trial,70 cases in which the relevant evidence is
used as a basis for questioning a grand jury witness,71 and finally “standing” cases in
65
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which the person seeking to exclude evidence is not the person who suffered the illegal
search.72 Recall now that the justification for ER is not that it captures one of the rights
guaranteed by the fourth amendment, but that it deters law enforcement personnel from
searching and seizing evidence in ways that contravene WR or PCR, ways that
unjustifiably infringe fourth amendment rights. Apart from the last exception, which I’ve
already criticized, all of these cases are such that the deterrent value of ER is either
insufficiently great to warrant exclusion, insignificant, or simply non-existent. So there is
no call to criticize the Court for having no principled way of retaining ER in the wake of
its exception-making decisions.
How then shall we understand the Court’s numerous references to the “balancing”
of competing interests as a requirement of constitutional adjudication in the area of fourth
amendment law? The critics see in the “balancing” (cost-benefit analysis) approach
implicit abandonment of WR, PCR, and ER in favor of a pragmatic, case-by-case method
of decision-making. Now it is true that there would be no room for “balancing” if the
rights protected by the fourth amendment were absolute. But they aren’t. Moreover,
“balancing” need not be conceived of as a form of consequentialist cost-benefit analysis
applied to the infringement of fourth amendment rights. Rather, “balancing” may be
understood as a way to determine whether the benefits of abandoning formal
requirements are sufficiently great to justify infringement of rights of varying degrees of
stringency. And much of what the Court has included in its “balancing” enquiries

72

Alderman, supra note 32; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128.

40

involves the further question whether the fourth amendment rights at issue have been
forfeited or either tacitly or explicitly waived. Thought of in this way, “balancing” is
consistent both with the retention of WR, PCR and ER and with the non-consequentialist
rights-based theory outlined above. I conclude that critics who argue that the Court’s
methodology of adjudication is internally inconsistent have confused consequentialist
cost-benefit analysis with non-consequentialist “balancing”. Within the context of a
rights-based theory of fourth amendment law, it is possible to provide a principled, nonarbitrary justification for almost all of the exceptions to the prophylactic rules the Court
has imposed as a means to protect against the violation of fourth amendment rights.

Objections and Replies
The rights-based approach I have been defending as the best reconstruction of the
theoretical foundations on which the Court has built its orthodox fourth amendment
jurisprudence takes its inspiration explicitly from moral philosophy. According to some
legal theorists, this is the wrong place to look for guidance in the enterprise of
constitutional interpretation. Among these theorists, Silas J. Wasserstrom and Louis
Michael Seidman take the argument one step further. For they claim, not only that “there
are serious obstacles to using moral philosophy to justify fourth amendment law”73 and
that “it…is doubtful that the writings of moral philosophers provide much that is useful to
settle contemporary disputes about the meaning of the fourth amendment,”74 but also that
73
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“a rights-based approach does not mesh very well with the structure of the fourth
amendment”.75 In the rest of this section, I will explain why these criticisms of
normative, rights-based approaches to fourth amendment interpretation are unwarranted,
and hope thereby to clear up the most significant misunderstandings that stand in the way
of widespread acceptance of such approaches.

First Objection: “A growing number of philosophers have come to doubt that the
techniques of moral philosophy can ever succeed in providing a neutral ground that will
allow us to escape our own beliefs and desires or, indeed, that this is even a coherent
goal.”76
Reply: These philosophers, influential as they are, are few and far between.77 The vast
majority of working moral philosophers believe that morality transcends self-interest and
that moral principles are objective. But even if the vast majority was mistaken, it is clear
that the Founding Fathers, steeped as they were in Lockean natural rights theory (from
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which contemporary rights-base approaches are directly descended) and in the
Enlightenment’s faith in Reason as a faculty capable of discovering objective truths,
intended the Bill of Rights (including the fourth amendment) to encapsulate fundamental,
objective, self-transcending, rationally discoverable principles.78 And it is the Court’s
function to interpret the Bill of Rights by giving content and structure to these objective
principles. Whether there are any such principles, therefore, is really neither here nor
there. What matters, at least with respect to constitutional adjudication, is that the Court
perform its function properly.

Second Objection: “Even if philosophers themselves were more self-confident, judges
still would have to decide which philosophers to listen to. Unfortunately, moral
philosophers who have thought about privacy do not speak with one voice. On the
contrary, they are hopelessly divided about what privacy is; about whether it is a value in
itself, or whether it is only valuable because of its consequences; about whether respect
for privacy is a facet of respect for personhood; about what claims the word ‘privacy’
encompasses; and even about whether it describes a coherent concept at all. A judge who
is determined to make use of what moral philosophy has to offer would have to evaluate
and choose between these conflicting positions. Moral philosophy may offer ways to
think about the choice more clearly. But it does not offer a technique for making the
78
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choice ‘objectively’ or in a fashion uncontaminated by the viewpoint of the person doing
the choosing.”79
Reply: First, concerning the point that “judges would have to pick and choose
between…conflicting positions”, it should be noted that judges are always inescapably in
the unenviable position of being required to pick and choose among competing rationales
in coming to their decisions. This is whatwe pay judges to do. So there is nothing
especially problematic about a judge’s having to choose among competing philosophical
theories of the fourth amendment. Second, concerning the fact of widespread
disagreement about the content and function of the right to privacy, it is, I think,
significant that most philosophers find the concept of privacy coherent even if a
definition (in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions) is hard to come by, just as
most philosophers would accept that the concept of a game is coherent (even if a
definition is hard, perhaps even impossible, to come by).80 What matters is that it is
possible to identify paradigm cases of justified and unjustified infringements of the right
to privacy, on the basis of which it is possible to identify other violations and nonviolations by analogy. The real divisions among moral philosophers in this area are over
79

Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 1, 59-60.

80

See W. A. Parent, “Recent Work on the Concept of Privacy,” American Philosophical

Quarterly 20 (1983): 341-355. Parent considers dozens of attempts by philosophers and
legal theorists to define “privacy”, all of whom presuppose that the concept of privacy is
coherent.

44

fine points of conceptual analysis and philosophical elucidation that judges need not
worry too much about (at least until the fanciful hypothetical scenarios philosophers
imagine in order to test our moral and semantic intuitions about the nature of privacy
become real). And with respect to rights-based approaches, it is worth pointing out that
there is much agreement on at least the general shape of a theory of rights (e.g., that
rights are not absolute, that some are less stringent than others, that a theory of rights
must make room for the waiving, forfeiting, and transferring of rights), agreement that is
far more significant in the area of fourth amendment interpretation than are the relatively
minor instances of philosophical hair-splitting mentioned by Wasserstrom & Seidman.
Finally, the charge that moral philosophy “does not offer a technique for making …
choice[s] ‘objectively’ or in a fashion uncontaminated by the viewpoint of the person
doing the choosing” is simply unfounded, at least if this means that judges must
ultimately base their choices among competing philosophical positions on mere whim or
political or ideological prejudices. Moral methodology has now reached a stage of
impressive sophistication, whether in the form of a search for “reflective equilibrium”81
or in the form of other more foundational (less coherentist) approaches.82 Indeed, if
objective moral truths are ever to be found, there appears to be no better way to discover
them than by relying on the techniques of moral philosophy that Wasserstrom & Seidman
so breezily dismiss.
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Third Objection: “It…is doubtful that the writings of moral philosophers provide much
that is useful to settle contemporary disputes about the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Most of these writings are on an extremely high level of generality. Philosophers have
argued at length about what ‘privacy’ means, and about the justifications for treating it as
a value or a right. In contemporary legal discourse, however, it is uncontroversial that
some value should be attached to privacy. The important issue in most fourth amendment
cases is the balance that should be struck between that value and competing concerns,
such as interests in effective law enforcement and in decision-making based upon full
information. Beyond the injunction to take privacy seriously, moral philosophers have
little to say about this crucial question.”83
Reply: First, the charge that moral philosophy has little to say about the particular issues
raised by the particular cases confronted by judges (such as those relevant to the proper
“balancing” of fourth amendment interests) is, upon reflection, unfair. In recent years,
moral philosophers in increasing numbers have contributed to the resolution of groundlevel ethical issues, such as the conditions (if any) under which abortion, suicide,
euthanasia, animal experimentation, gene therapy, and the killing of non-combatants in
war are morally permissible. And there is no reason to believe that philosophers could
not do the same (or better) in the way of discovering the precise conditions under which
fourth amendment rights are justifiably infringed. Moreover, were philosophers to find
themselves unable to contribute to a resolution of difficult ground-level moral issues, this
might simply reflect the presence of incommensurable values that make it very difficult
83
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(perhaps even impossible) to determine a unique correct answer. And that’s no skin off
the philosopher’s nose. Second, even if it is incapable of providing clear guidance in
particular cases, moral philosophy can still help judges establish a single coherent
framework within which all fourth amendment questions should be decided, enabling
them to narrow disagreement to matters of crucial significance and avoid unnecessary
theoretical confusion and conflict. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any other form of
intellectual endeavor that would have the resources to provide judges with the relevant
sort of assistance.

Fourth Objection: “A rights-based approach does not mesh very well with the structure of
the fourth amendment. The amendment, as commonly understood, does not provide an
absolute shield against even the most extreme invasions of privacy and liberty. It does
not establish a right to privacy that trumps competing policy concerns. Instead, the fourth
amendment prohibits searches only when the likelihood that the invasion will be
productive fails to justify the cost. In its most general form, this translates into an
insistence that the search be reasonable. When the Court attempts to give the
requirement a somewhat more determinate content, it insists that the search be supported
by ‘probable cause’ or ‘reasonable suspicion’. In either case, however, the amendment
requires no more than that the invasion be cost-justified in some sense.”84
Reply: First, as I have been at some pains to explain, it is simply false to suggest that
rights-based approaches cannot accommodate the fact that “the amendment…does not
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provide an absolute shield against even the most extreme invasions of privacy and
liberty”. For it is an axiom of contemporary rights-based theories that not all rights are
absolute. Except for Kant (perhaps), I know of no rights-theorists who would deny this
axiom. It may be that Wasserstrom & Seidman intend to apply this objection only to
“Kantian” approaches in particular.85 But in that case, their objection simply ignores the
non-Kantian (or non-absolutist variants of Kantian) approaches embraced by most
contemporary rights-theorists. Second, it is also simply false to say that the fourth
amendment “does not establish a right to privacy that trumps competing policy
concerns”. For, as we’ve seen, the pillars of orthodox fourth amendment doctrine (WR,
PCR, and ER) are nothing other than means of protecting fourth amendment rights in a
large number of cases in which competing policy concerns dictate that the rights should
give way. (It may be that Wasserstrom & Seidman think that all “trumps” must be
absolute. If so, then, as I’ve just argued, their criticism does not so much as apply to
“non-absolutist” rights-theorists.) Third, the claim that the fourth amendment “requires
no more than that [invasions of privacy] be cost-justified in some sense” is also false.
For, as I’ve argued, the best way of understanding the “balancing” of interests that the
amendment has been read to require is partly as an attempt to specify the conditions
under which the infringement of rights of varying degrees of stringency are justified, and
partly as an attempt to determine the conditions under which rights are forfeited or either
explicitly or implicitly waived. Understood in this way, “balancing” is better seen as an
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application of a non-consequentialist rights-based approach than as the application of a
consequentialist cost-benefit analysis.

Fifth Objection: “The difficulty in defending a normative theory of the fourth amendment
also has had an impact on the reach of fourth amendment doctrine. We have seen already
how the problem of justifying a normative theory has, on occasion, led the court into a
circular definition of ‘searches’. Reasonable expectations are defined by reference to a
current reality that includes the very practices under attack, rather than by reference to the
kinds of expectations people would have in a normatively attractive society. It is less
commonly realized that the threshold requirement of state action also serves to entrench
the status quo rather than to transform it in a fashion that would comport with the
normative program advocated by philosophical defenders of privacy.”86
Reply: First, concerning the circularity in the Court’s definition of “search”, we’ve
already seen that it constitutes a clumsy and inadequate way to capture a legitimate and
non-circular principle founded on axiomatic principles of contemporary rights-based
theory. And it is a major advantage of the rights-based approach that it has the resources
to justify the Court’s holdings in Katz and its progeny without relying on ad hoc and
circular definitions. Second, the claim that the Court’s way of specifying the reach of the
fourth amendment “serves to entrench the status quo” is justified only on the supposition
that the scope of the protected privacy interest reaches no further than what is included
under the rubric of “reasonable expectations”. But, as I’ve argued, the interests protected
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by the fourth amendment are not expectations (reasonable or otherwise), but rights.
There is therefore no reason whatever to believe that the best reconstruction of the
Court’s fourth amendment jurisprudence, one founded on the concept of “right”, rather
than on the concept of “interest” or “expectation”, is inherently conservative.

Sixth Objection: “Current fourth amendment doctrine is inconsistent with [a] normative
theory of privacy [that consists in a “program to protect the right to be let alone”] in two
ways. First, the fourth amendment imposes no constitutional obligation on the
government to intervene when privacy values are at risk. Victims of private violence
would be laughed out of court if they suggested that the government’s failure to protect
them stated a constitutional claim…Second, even if the government voluntarily chooses
to act in order to control private invasions, the fourth amendment may obstruct those
efforts. By outlawing the most effective techniques for controlling burglars, rapists, and
muggers, the amendment, in at least some situations, results in an overall reduction in
personal privacy. All this suggests that an approach treating the fourth amendment as
embodying a normative theory is fundamentally misconceived.”87
Reply: It is indeed true that the principles underlying the fourth amendment do not
constitute a program of privacy-maximization. And it may indeed be that putting these
principles into effect results in the hamstringing of law enforcement, and consequently in
“an overall reduction in personal privacy”. But the rights-based theory on which I have
claimed the fourth amendment is founded is not a privacy-maximization program: it is a
87
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set of principles proscribing violations of fourth amendment rights (including the right to
privacy) by government agents acting as such. And there is no reason to expect that the
implementation of such a program would reduce violations of fourth amendment rights
overall. So I am ready to accept that current fourth amendment doctrine is inconsistent
with a normative theory of privacy that consists in a program to protect the right to be let
alone. But it does not follow from this, nor have Wasserstrom & Seidman given us any
reason to accept, that current fourth amendment doctrine is inconsistent with any and all
normative theories of privacy, or of the amendment more generally.

Whither the Fourth Amendment?
In recent years, the Court has begun to distance itself from orthodox fourth
amendment jurisprudence. Drawing on a meager and shaky line of precedent,88 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority in Wyoming v. Houghton, proposed an entirely new
constitutional method of resolving fourth amendment disputes. As he put it:
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In determining whether a particular governmental action violates [the fourth
amendment], we inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful
search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed
…Where that inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure
under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.89

This method of fourth amendment adjudication promises to overturn decades of
precedent by abandoning the Court’s now traditional appeals to WR and PCR (except
insofar as they are consistent with the new approach) in determining the constitutionality
of a search or seizure that allegedly violates fourth amendment rights.
There is some reason to believe the continual intellectual pummeling that the
Court has received from critics within the legal academy across the ideological spectrum
charging that its orthodox fourth amendment decisions are theoretically inconsistent and
incoherent has contributed to the increasing appeal of alternative methods of fourth
amendment adjudication, including Scalia’s “common-law originalism”. Among the
charges with which Scalia agrees is the claim that the orthodox definition of a “search” is
totally without textual or other legitimate constitutional support. As Scalia put it in his
concurring opinion in Minnesota v. Carter:
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The dissent believes that “[o]ur obligation to produce coherent results” requires
that we ignore [the] clear text and four-century-old tradition, and apply instead the
notoriously unhelpful test adopted in a “benchmar[k]” decision that is 31 years
old [i.e., Katz]. In my view, the only thing the past three decades have established
about the Katz test (which has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice
Harlan’s separate concurrence in Katz…) is that, unsurprisingly, those “actual
(subjective) expectation[s] of privacy” “that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable’,”…bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy
that this Court considers reasonable. When that self-indulgent test is employed
(as the dissent would employ it here) to determine whether a “search or seizure”
within the meaning of the Constitution has occurred (as opposed to whether that
“search or seizure” is an “unreasonable” one), it has no plausible foundation in the
text of the Fourth Amendment.90

In addition, in his concurrence in California v. Acevedo, Scalia explicitly cited the
Court’s carving of exceptions to WR with the assistance of Harlan’s definition of a
“search” as a reason to abandon the orthodox approach in favor of his own “common law
originalism”:
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Even before today’s decision, the “warrant requirement” had become so riddled
with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable…Our intricate body of law
regarding “reasonable expectation of privacy” has been developed largely as a
means of creating these exceptions, enabling a search to be denominated not a
Fourth Amendment “search” and therefore not subject to the general warrant
requirement. Unlike the dissent, therefore, I do not regard today’s holding as
some momentous departure, but rather as merely the continuation of an
inconsistent jurisprudence that has been with us for years. There can be no clarity
in this area unless we make up our minds, and unless the principles we express
comport with the actions we take. In my view, the path out of this confusion
should be sought by returning to the first principle that the “reasonableness”
requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that the common
law afforded.91

But as I have labored to show, although Harlan’s test is not grounded in the text
of the fourth amendment, the fundamental principle it was designed to articulate is. This
principle, rooted in a rights-based theory that is a direct descendant of the natural law
theory accepted by Scalia’s 18th century heroes, is thoroughly objective and far from selfindulgent. Taken in conjunction with the Court’s objectively justified orthodox means of
protecting fourth amendment rights (namely, WR, PCR, and ER), the principle that
Harlan recognized (albeit dimly) represents a coherent, objective, and textually supported
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normative theory of fourth amendment jurisprudence that is more than capable of
withstanding the barbs that countless critics have been throwing at the orthodox
approach. I submit that it is on this basis (as well as for reasons having to do with the
general untenability of “common law originalism”)92 that the Court should, in its future
fourth amendment decisions, decisively reject Scalia’s unprecedented proposals.
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